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MINIMUM CONTACTS: ONLY ONE
PART OF THE PERSONAL
JURISDICTION ANALYSIS
State ex rel. Honda Research and Development Co., Ltd. v. Adolf
Tens of thousands of Americans will be injured this year, some of them
fatally, as a result of all terrain vehicle accidents. 2 While human factors such
as drunken riding and inexperience cause some percentage of the injuries,
the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) believes that the ATV's
design is responsible for most accidents.3 Honda Ltd., which manufactures
an ATV marketed as the ATC, contends that rider misuse is to blame for
the accidents, and that the basic design is safe.4 In State ex rel. Honda
Research and Development Co., Ltd. v. Adolf, (hereinafter Honda R&D)
a Missouri appellate court held that Missouri does not have personal juris-
diction over the Japanese corporation which designed the Honda ATC. The
court determined that the "minimum contacts" necessary to sustain juris-
diction did not exist. The court addressed only the minimum contacts issue,6
1. 718 S.W.2d 550 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
2. Based on hospital emergency room reports, ATC related injuries in the
United States numbered 66,956 in 1984. At least 161 people died between January
1982 and April 1985 from ATV accidents. The injuries for 1984 are almost two-and-
one-half times greater than those for 1983, and seven times greater than 1982. ATVs
account for twice as many injuries as mini-bikes/trail bikes, and eight times as many
as snowmobiles. The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) estimated that
2.5 million ATVs were available for use at the end of 1985, and that the number
would increase. See CPSC, All-Terrain Vehicles; Advanced Notice of Proposed Rule-
making; Request for Comments and Data, 50 Fed. Reg. 23,139 (1985) (to be codified
at 16 C.F.R. ch. II).
3. "[T]he Commission staff is presently of the opinion that the performance
characteristics of the ATVs comprise the single most prominent factor identifiable as
a cause of loss of control." Id. at 23,141.
4. See Statement of American Honda Motor Company before the Subcommittee
on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the House Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations (May 21, 1985) [hereinafter Statement of American Honda].
5. 718 S.W.2d 550 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
6. The court does not discuss whether this cause of action is covered by
the Missouri long-arm statute, Mo. REV. STAT. § 506.500 (1986). A prerequisite to
the due process analysis is determining whether the act in question is covered by the
long-arm statute. If it falls within the purview of the long-arm statute, the court
commences with the jurisdictional analysis. See Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction
Over Non-resident Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REv.
1
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and thus did not complete the jurisdictional analysis prescribed in Burger
King v. Rudzewicz.7 This failure to apply the proper test accounts for an
unfair result and a precedent which encourages foreign manufacturers to
align their corporate structure so as to insulate design materials from dis-
covery attempts by American plaintiffs. This Note will conduct an analysis
independent from the court of appeals, following instead the Burger King
approach.
The due process clause8 of the fourteenth amendment prohibits a court
from asserting jurisdiction over a defendant outside the forum unless that
defendant has sufficient "minimum contacts" 9 with the forum so as to pro-
vide "fair warning"' 1 that he is amenable to suit in the forum. Due process
requires only that assertion of jurisdiction be "reasonable" and "fair."" In
Honda R&D the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District con-
cluded that, although Honda Research and Development Co. (hereinafter
Honda R&D) designed the ATC specifically for the American market, due
process prohibited compelling that corporation to defend a personal injury
suit in Missouri arising from the ATC's presence in the state. 12 This decision
fails to serve the purpose and policies underlying the United States Supreme
Court's personal jurisdiction analysis as articulated in International Shoe
Company v. Washington" and its progeny. 14
1028 (1965).
Missouri courts, however, have interpreted the reach of the long-arm statute to
be "co-extensive with that of due process." Medicine Shoppe Int'l v. J-Pral Corp.,
662 S.W.2d 263, 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). The Missouri "single-act tort" statute,
Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.633 (1986), provides that a foreign corporation which commits
a tort in Missouri is deemed to be doing business in Missouri. This statute has been
upheld as constitutional by the Missouri Supreme Court. State ex rel. Deere & Co.
v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1970) (en banc). The question is whether personal
injury resulting from defective design can be interpreted as "committing a tort in
whole or in part" in Missouri. Under the interpretation first given in Gray v. American
Radiator, 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), a tort is committed where the last
act necessary to render the actor liable occurs. Id. at 434, 176 N.E.2d at 762-63.
Because the plaintiff in Honda R&D was injured in Missouri, the long-arm
statute was satisfied. Hence, the Honda R&D court needed to conduct only a due
process analysis.
7. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
9. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
10. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 469 (1985).
11. See Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
12. Honda Research & Dev. Co. v. Adolf, 718 S.W.2d 550 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986). "That the machine in question was designed and developed for the United
States market ... does not subject Honda Research to Missouri jurisdiction absent
other necessary contacts." Id. at 552-53.
13. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
14. E.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court of
2
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The plaintiff in Honda R&D, Mary Alice Schneider, brought a personal
injury action based upon strict product liability for injuries sustained while
riding a Honda ATC. 15 Plaintiff filed the action against the manufacturer
of the ATC, Honda Motor Company Ltd. (hereinafter Honda Ltd.), the
distributor/importer, American Honda Motor Co. Inc. (hereinafter American
Honda), and the local dealer, St. Louis Honda. In an amended petition, the
plaintiff added the designer, Honda R&D. Honda R&D, a Japanese cor-
poration, filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction which
the trial court denied. The design company then filed its petition for a writ
of mandamus, 16 in which it requested the appellate court to reverse the order
denying Honda R&D's motion and to dismiss Honda R&D for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction. The appellate court agreed with Honda R&D, and ordered
the trial judge to dismiss Honda R&D from the lawsuit.' 7 The issue before
the court was whether Honda R&D was subject to the personal jurisdiction
of Missouri courts based on the sale of the ATC in Missouri. 8
California, 439 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
15. Honda Research & Dev., 718 S.W.2d at 550.
16. Mandamus is the remedy used to prevent a court from acting in excess
of its jurisdiction. State ex rel. Brooks Erection & Constr. Co. v. Gaertner, 639
S.W.2d 848, 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). Since the present case is in the pretrial stage,
the facts of the underlying dispute have not yet been fully developed. For purposes
of a jurisdictional analysis, however, the germane aspects of the substantive dispute
are sufficiently clear.
17. Honda Research & Dev., 718 S.W.2d at 553.
18. Although the plaintiff's brief discussed the issue, the court did not address
the possibility of jurisdiction over Honda R&D based on the proximity of ties between
the three Honda companies.
In his concurring opinion Judge Gaertner discussed the issue of corporate inter-
relationship. The plaintiff added Honda R&D in order to obtain discovery about the
ATC design. Honda Ltd. and American Honda had claimed that the design infor-
mation was in Honda R&D's exclusive possession. Judge Gaertner pointed out:
That our decision upholds the separateness of the three corporate entities
for jurisdictional purposes should not necessarily be interpreted as deter-
minative of the "control" by the parent of documents in the "custody or
possession" of a wholly owned subsidiary, as those terms are used in Rule
58.01. Nor do we decide today the possible consequences if it be made to
appear that corporate separation rather than departmental or divisional con-
trol of the phases of the total undertaking is merely a subterfuge adopted
or utilized for the purpose of evading discovery (a suggestion hinted at but
not briefed by respondent herein).
Honda Research & Dev., 718 S.W.2d at 553 (Gaertner, J., concurring). Three cases
involving the Honda triumvirate shed light on the issue of corporate control and
suggest that Judge Gaertner's concerns are valid.
In Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1981), Honda Ltd.
expressly agreed to assume liability for any design or manufacturing defect involving
the Honda AN600 (a small car) even though Honda R&D had designed the car. On
remand, Dorsey v. American Honda Motor Co., 670 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1982), Honda
1987]
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Honda R&D is one of three corporations responsible for the presence
of the ATC in Missouri. A look at the functions of each of the three Honda
companies and a brief history of the ATC's development and distribution
will help illustrate the jurisdictional issues involved. American Honda is the
exclusive national distributor of Honda products in the United States. 9 For
many years Honda Ltd., which manufactures all Honda products, made only
motorcycles. American Honda requested Honda R&D to develop a product
suitable for sale in the American market during winter, as motorcycles were
not highly marketable during that time. 20 Honda R&D endeavored to design
a recreational vehicle for use on snow, mud and dirt.2' After extensive re-
search and testing, Honda R&D was satisfied that it had developed a product.
marketable in the United States.
When the design was ready for manufacture, Honda R&D sold the design
to Honda Ltd., pursuant to its role in the overall Honda scheme. 2 The
Ltd. tried to disclaim any liability for design defect, pointing an accusatory finger at
Honda R&D. The court refused to accept the argument, noting that since the dis-
tinction between the two companies was blurred at trial, it was too late for Honda
Ltd. to propose this defense.
In another case involving Honda, a Florida appellate court found that while
Honda R&D is "separate and distinct" from Honda Ltd., it is nonetheless a wholly
owned subsidiary. American Honda Motor Co. v. Vetour, 435 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983). As such, Honda Ltd. was required to produce the discovery materials
it claimed were in Honda R&D's exclusive control.
In Fjelsted v. American Honda Motor Co., 762 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1985), Honda
attempted a third permutation of its corporate shell game, likewise without success.
American Honda, the distributor, claimed it could not get the requested discovery
information from Honda Ltd., the manufacturer, because Honda Ltd. would not
release the materials unless it was a party to the lawsuit. The court rejected the
argument and compelled American Honda to produce the desired discovery materials.
These cases reveal a pattern of behavior: Honda Ltd., as the parent corporation,
offered different presentations of its corporate structure in different factual situations,
apparently in search of an arrangement which would insulate its design materials
from discovery (absent the inclusion of Honda R&D as a party). This misleading and
inconsistent behavior proffered by Honda is surely the type of "subterfuge" contem-
plated by Judge Gaertner.
19. Statement of American Honda, supra note 4.
20, Statement of Edward Glynn, Assistant Vice President of the Motor Cycle
Sales Division of the American Honda Motor Corp. before the Consumer Product
Safety Commission at the Industry/CPSC Meeting on Safety Programs for Three-
Wheel All-Terrain Vehicles (October 23, 1984); see also Statement of American Honda,
supra note 4.
21. Statement of American Honda, supra note 4. The original ATC was
introduced into the American market in 1970. In the late 1970's a Honda R&D
engineer was in America and discovered that Americans were using the ATC for such
other purposes as agriculture, ranching, and racing. Id. In response, Honda R&D
developed more specialized vehicles to serve these diverse markets.
22. Honda R&D's role in the overall scheme is only to design. The chief
engineer of Honda R&D has testified that the sole function of his company is to
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amount of consideration paid, if any, is unknown. The sale took place en-
tirely within Japan. Honda Ltd. used this design to manufacture the ATC.
The ATC was then sold to American Honda, which brought the vehicle to
America and introduced it in 1970.23 This system of design, manufacture,
and distribution is still used by the Honda companies and accounts for the
presence in Missouri of the ATC which injured the plaintiff.
Honda R&D is exclusively a Japanese corporation. It produces no tan-
gible goods, nor does it have any business offices or other contacts with the
United States. 24 The company's only connection to Missouri is the sale and
use of products which it designs. The evolution of the personal jurisdiction
analysis demonstrates the considerations that need to be addressed in deter-
mining whether this relationship is sufficient to allow Missouri courts to
assert jurisdiction over Honda R&D.
The modern approach 25 to personal jurisdiction emanates from the Su-
preme Court's opinion in International Shoe Co. v. Washington:26
[D]ue Process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judg-
ment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
that he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."2
The Court adopted this standard in response to the growing economic and
commercial complexities of society. The previous jurisdictional test, which
depended on the presence of the defendant within the forum, had become
ineffective in light of the prevalence of multi-state transactions. The Inter-
23. Brief for Respondent at 5, Honda Research & Dev., 718 S.W.2d 550
.(1986) (No. 51655).
24. Id.
25. The modem approach is distinguished from the doctrine of Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), which is summarized as follows:
Pennoyer limited state jurisdiction to physical presence within the state's
boundaries as shown by four separate situations: first, if the defendant was
domiciled within the forum state; second, if the defendant was served with
process while physically present within the forum state; third, if the defend-
ant had consented to jurisdiction within the forum state; and fourth, if the
defendant had property within the jurisdiction of the forum that was at-
tached prior to commencement of the suit.
Note, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson: Minimum Contacts in a Modern World,
8 PEPPERD NE L. Rsv. 783, 787-88 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
26. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Washington State was seeking unemployment con-
tributions from International Shoe because the company employed thirteen salesmen
in Washington. International Shoe, which was headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri,
argued that Washington did not have jurisdiction because International Shoe's "ac-
tivities within the state were not sufficient to manifest its 'presence' there." Id. at
315.
27. Id. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1920)).
1987]
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national Shoe standard is intentionally couched in general propositions which
are flexible and broad in scope. The Supreme Court wanted its general guide-
lines applicable to the plethora of jurisdictional questions addressed by the
lower courts. Because the International Shoe standard is so flexible, however,
no "mechanical or quantitative" 28 application is possible, and absolute an-
swers to jurisdictional questions are rare. 29 Rather, the "minimum contacts"
test depends upon the "reasonableness" of jurisdiction in the particular sit-
uation, and reasonableness depends upon the unique facts of the individual
case at hand.30 Later cases applying the minimum contacts standard flesh
out the types of contacts which are of a sufficient "quality and nature" to
support personal jurisdiction.
The general guidelines of International Shoe were specifically applied in
McGee v. International Life Insurance Company.3 The Supreme Court allowed
California to assert jurisdiction over a Texas insurance company whose only
contact with California was an insurance contract sent by the company to
California. 2 McGee offers two considerations to the due process analysis.
First, modern transportation and communication minimize the inconven-
iences of defending a suit in a state where the defendant engages in economic
activity.3 3 Second, a court should consider any interest the forum state may
have in adjudicating the plaintiff's type of claim for its residents when con-
sidering the propriety of jurisdiction. 34
Concerned that McGee might be interpreted too broadly,35 the Court
held in Hanson v. Denckla36 that there must be some act by which a defendant
28. Id. at 319.
29. "We recognize that this determination is one in which few answers will
be written in black and white. The greys are dominant and even among those the
shades are innumerable." Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (citing
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948)).
30. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
31. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
32. The plaintiff in McGee was the beneficiary of a life insurance policy
between defendant and plaintiff's decedent. Decedent had purchased the policy by
mail from Texas. When the Texas insurance company refused to honor the policy,
plaintiff brought suit in California where she obtained a default judgment. Plaintiff
subsequently brought the judgment to Texas. The Texas court refused to execute on
it, however, on the basis that California lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
found jurisdiction despite the lack of any other contacts between the defendant and
California, and ordered the Texas court to enforce the California judgment. Id. at
224.
33. The McGee court noted a "fundamental transformation in our national
economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch two or more
states and involve parties separated by a full continent .... At the same time modem
transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party
sued to defend himself in a state where he engages in economic activity." Id. at 222-
23.
34. Id.
35. The court in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), stated:
[Vol. 52
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"purposefully avails itself" of the privileges of conducting activities in the
forum before jurisdiction is proper." In Hanson, Dora Donner, a Pennsyl-
vania resident, executed a trust with a Delaware trust company in which she
retained a power of appointment. She thereafter moved to Florida, where
she executed her power of appointment. In a dispute over her estate, the
issue was whether Florida courts had jurisdiction over the Delaware trust
company. 38 The Court distinguished this case from McGee in that the cause
of action in Hanson did not "arise out of a transaction consummated in the
forum state." 39 The contested transaction, the establishment of the trust, had
no connection to Florida other than the subsequent relocation of the settlor
to that state. The insurance contract in McGee, on the other hand, was
entered into in the forum state of California. Hanson's contribution to the
magic language4 of the due process analysis is two-fold: the defendant must
"purposefully avail" himself in the forum, and the "unilateral activity" of
the plaintiff cannot be sufficient to support jurisdiction.4'
The reasoning of McGee and Hanson was reaffirmed by the Court in
Kulko v. Superior Court of California.42 The dispute involved a child support
proceeding between divorced parents. The mother brought suit in California
against the father, who was a resident of New York.43 Noting that due process
In response to these changes [technological advances], the requirements
for personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants have evolved from
the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, to the flexible standard of International
Shoe. But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual
demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts....
However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant
may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the "minimal contacts"
with that state that are a pre-requisite to its exercise of power over him.
Id. at 251.
36. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
37. Id. at 253.
38. Id. at 238-44.
39. Id. at 251.
40. Because the touchstones of the due process analysis are fairness and rea-
sonableness, it is a very flexible standard. The same general language of a few Supreme
Court decisions is applied to a myriad of factual situations which arise, with varying
results. "Magic language" refers to those phrases encountered time and again in
opinions wrestling with the personal jurisdiction question.
41. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
42. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
43. This suit arose out of a divorce settlement between plaintiff Sharon Kulko
Horn and defendant Ezra Kulko. During their marriage, Horn and Kulko were res-
idents of New York. Upon separation and subsequent divorce, Horn moved to Cal-
ifornia with one of the couple's two children. The other child, Darwin, stayed with
Kulko in New York during the school year and with his mother in California during
the summer. Pursuant to the divorce agreement, Kulko paid no child support, but
he gave Horn $3000 to help maintain the children in the summer. Three and one half
years after the divorce, Darwin asked for and received his father's permission to
1987]
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is satisfied when jurisdiction is "reasonable and fair,""4 the Court gave three
reasons for denying California jurisdiction over the father. First, the father
did not "purposefully derive benefit" from the child's presence in Califor-
nia,45 any benefit to the father (i.e., financial gain) was due not to the child's
residence in California but rather to his absence from New York. Second,
the father did not initiate the contact with California. He merely acquiesced
to his child's wishes.46 Third, public policy seeks to avoid straining family
relations by forcing a father to choose between honoring the desires of his
child or protecting himself from defending a suit in a distant forum.4 7 Thus,
Kulko adds three factors to the minimum contacts analysis. Did the defendant
derive any benefits, directly or indirectly, from his contact with the forum
state? Did the defendant initiate the contacts with the forum state? Is there
any substantial public policy matter involved in the determination of juris-
diction?
The first Supreme Court. case to apply the minimum contacts test to a
products liability case was World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,4 decided
in 1980. Plaintiffs purchased an Audi automobile in New York from Seaway,
a local Audi dealer. The following year, as the plaintiffs were travelling through
Oklahoma en route to their new home in Arizona, another vehicle struck
the Audi from the rear. The accident caused a fire which severely burned
the plaintiffs. 49 Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit in Oklahoma based on strict
products liability, alleging defective design and placement of the Audi's gas
tank and fuel system. Named as defendants were the manufacturer (Audi),
the importer (Volkswagen of America), the regional distributor in New York
(World-Wide), and Seaway. 0 World-Wide and Seaway entered special ap-
pearances to challenge Oklahoma's jurisdiction." Although World-Wide dis-
tributed in only three states, (New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut) and
had no contacts with Oklahoma other than the presence of the plaintiffs' car
move to California permanently. Horn then commenced a suit to compel Kulko to
pay child support and to gain full custody of the children for herself. Relying on the
"effects test," (See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) CONFLICTS OF LAW § 37 (1971)), the
California Supreme Court affirmed jurisdiction over Kulko in California. Kulko v.
Superior Court of San Francisco, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586
(1978). The Supreme Court reversed this finding of jurisdiction. Kulko, 436 U.S. at
101.
44. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92.
45. Id. at 96.
46. Id. at 97.
47. Id. at 97-98.
48. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
49. Id. at 288.
50. Id.
51. Audi and Volkswagen of America, both foreign corporations, did not
contest jurisdiction in Oklahoma or the United States.
[Vol. 52
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there 5 2 the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction over World-Wide
and Seaway. The court based its decision on the inherent mobility of the
automobile and the benefits received indirectly from the Oklahoma highway
system.53
The United States Supreme Court reversed, focusing on the necessity of
notice. Jurisdiction may not be asserted unless a defendant's activities are
such that he can "reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in the forum
state.54 Contacts with the forum resulting from independent occurrences over
which the defendant has no influence cannot support jurisdiction. If a defend-
ant's connection to a forum arises from purposeful conduct directed toward
the forum, such as employing salesmen 5 within the state or shipping com-
mercial goods56 into it, so that his relation to the forum results from inten-
tional conduct rather than random chance, the due process notice requirement
is satisfied.57 To illustrate, a New York car dealer can certainly foresee that
a car he sells may be driven on the highways of America and be involved in
an accident in Oklahoma. This type of foreseeability is inadequate to support
jurisdiction, however, because the unilateral act of the purchaser, not the
efforts of the dealer, account for the auto's presence in Oklahoma.58 Due
process foreseeability has a limited scope. It compels a defendant to anticipate
only those results caused by his activity which is within, or intended to reach,
the forum. He is not accountable for the volitional acts of others which a
tort definition may classify as "foreseeable. '59
Despite the foreseeability problems voiced by the majority, Justice Bren-
nan would have found jurisdiction in Oklahoma. His dissent in World-Wide
emphasizes the policies underlying constitutional limitations on jurisdiction.
Basing his opinion on the touchstones of "fairness and reasonableness, ' 6'
52. Observing that World-Wide's association with Audi was "contractual only,"
the Court deemed the four corporations "independent." Thus, the acts of the man-
ufacturer and importer were not imputed to World-Wide. World-Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 289.
53. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 354 (Okla. 1978).
54. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295. In other words, the defendant
must be able to foresee the possibility of a suit in the forum state. However,
the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum state. Rather, it
is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are such
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.
Id.
55. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
56. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
57. See id.
58. See id. at 298.
59. See supra note 54.
60. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9
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Justice Brennan foreshadowed his majority opinion in Burger King v.
Rudzewicz6 2 by declaring minimum contacts only the first step in the juris-
dictional analysis.63 In addition, the court should take notice of "other con-
siderations," including: the forum state's interest in the dispute,6 the actual
burden on the defendant, 65 whether the suit was filed by a resident of the
forum,6 whether the state has enacted a long-arm statute covering the cause
of action, 67 whether the cause of action arose out of the defendant's activity
in the forum,68 and whether the defendant derives substantial benefits from
forums other than its own. 69 If the state has a sufficient interest in the
litigation, Justice Brennan places a burden on the defendant to show some
"real injury to a constitutionally protected interest." ' 70
In Burger King,7 1 the Court adopted Brennan's view that substantial
"other considerations" allow for a lesser showing of minimum contacts nec-
essary to establish jurisdiction.7 2 The Court bifurcated the jurisdictional anal-
ysis into "minimum contacts" and "other considerations." 73 After determining
what contacts, if any, the defendant has with the forum, the following con-
siderations should be addressed to determine if jurisdiction is reasonable: 74
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effectivd relief, 75 the in-
62. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). Interestingly, Justice White wrote the majority opin-
ion in World- Wide and Justice Brennan filed a dissent. In Burger King their roles
were reversed: Brennan wrote for the majority and White joined in Justice Stevens'
dissenting opinion. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 487.
63. "Surely International Shoe contemplated that the significance of contacts
necessary to support jurisdiction would diminish if some other consideration helped
establish that jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable." World-Wide Volkswagen
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 300 (1980).
64. Specifically, notice should be taken of the "State's manifest interest in pro-
viding effective means of redress for its citizens." Id.
65. Id. (citing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)).
66. Id. at 302.
67. See id. at 305.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 307.
70. Id. at 312.
71. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). Defendant entered into a franchising agreement with
plaintiff, a Florida corporation, to operate a Burger King restaurant in Michigan.
Most of defendant's contacts with Burger King were through a district office in
Michigan, although he was aware that Burger King's corporate headquarters were in
Miami. A federal district court in Florida found Florida to have jurisdiction. The
Eleventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court, finding that the franchise contract
had substantial contact with Florida, that defendant purposefully directed his activities
at Florida, and that defendant could reasonably foresee being haled into court in
Florida, reversed the court of appeals and found jurisdiction in Florida. Id. at 487.
72. Id. at 477.
73. See id.
74. These considerations will be referred to as the "fair play and substantialjustice" analysis in order to distinguish them from the "minimum contacts" analysis.
75. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
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terstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution
of controversies, 76 and the shared interests of the several states in furthering
fundamental social policies. 77
In addition to the two-part analysis, Burger King adopts another aspect
of Justice Brennan's dissent in Worldwide.78 A defendant who has purpose-
fully directed his activities at forum residents "must present a compelling
case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction
unreasonable. ' 79 In Burger King, the Supreme Court expanded the authority
of state courts to assert jurisdiction over non-resident defendants by allowing
the courts to consider underlying policies as well as the traditional minimum
contacts.
From International Shoe to Burger King, the Supreme Court addressed
many different factual situations.8 0 The "magic language" issuing from each
decision, however, was designed for the same purpose: to serve the particular
inquiry into "reasonableness and fairness." While the jurisdictional analysis
is extremely fact-oriented and intricate, the overriding purpose is clear. Rather
than provide any mechanical test, the Court's analysis suggests factors and
policies to consider in order to determine whether asserting jurisdiction over
this defendant in these circumstances is fair, reasonable and just.
In Honda R&D, the court of appeals held that Missouri did not have
jurisdiction over Honda Research and Development Company, the designer
of the Honda ATC.8' The court, however, conducted only the first part of
the jurisdictional analysis, the minimum contacts aspect. Because Honda
R&D did not sell anything which entered Missouri,8 the court held that it
could not reasonably foresee the possibility of litigation in this state.83 The
court quotes the following language from Worldwide Volkswagen:
[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as Audi or
Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts
of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market
for its product in other States, it is-not unreasonable to subject it to suit in
one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the
source of injury to its owner or to others2'
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See supra note 69.
79. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
80. The underlying dispute in International Shoe was unemployment fund
contributions; in Hanson the distribution of a trust fund; in Kulko a divorce agree-
ment; in World-Wide a products liability action; and in Burger King a franchise
agreement.
81. Honda Research & Dev., 718 S.W.2d 550 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
82. Id. at 551.
83. Id. at 552.
84. Honda Research & Dev., 718 S.W.2d at 552. (citing World-Wide Volk-
swagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
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The court interpreted this language to apply only to manufacturers and dis-
tributors, not designers." The fact that Honda R&D designed the ATC spe-
cifically for the American market was found insufficient to support jurisdiction
absent any other contacts.16 Finding no additional ties between the Japanese
corporation and Missouri, the court ordered Honda R&D dismissed from
the suit. 87
The critical concern at the time of Pennoyer v. Neff,88 was the burden
on the defendant if he were compelled to defend a suit in the forum state.
At the time of Pennoyer, a defendant faced a significant hardship in traveling
to a distant state. This consideration, however, has been significantly de-
emphasized in recent years, starting with McGee.89 Modern jumbo jets make
travel from Japan to Missouri almost as easy as a drive across town. Packing
an extra suitcase containing the desired discovery materials can hardly be a
constitutionally cognizable burden.9
While defendant's burden has lost much of its vitality as a factor in the
jurisdictional analysis, the purposeful availment factor has gained promi-
nence. Due process demands that a defendant's activities in connection with
the forum be of such a quality and nature that he have "fair warning" that
he may be haled into court there. 9' This consideration assures that the defend-
ant's contact with the forum is not the result of events which are "random,
fortuitous, or attenuated. " 92 A defendant who specifically directs his conduct
toward the forum state can hardly assert that the resulting contact is the
result of some unforeseeable event. The concern, as quoted by the Honda
R&D court, is that the mere "unilateral activity of those who claim some
relationship with a non-resident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of
contact with the forum state." 93 [emphasis added].
The court misinterprets this language. The unilateral activity in the pres-
ent case is not that of the person claiming a relationship between Honda
R&D and Missouri (i.e., the plaintiff). Honda R&D's contacts with Missouri
exist entirely without regard to any behavior on the plaintiff's part. The
plaintiff bought the ATC in Missouri and was injured by it there. This
85. Honda Research & Dev., 718 S.W.2d at 552.
86. Id. at 552-53.
87. Id. at 553.
88. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
89. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
90. "Assuming that a State gives a nonresident defendant adequate notice
and opportunity to defend, I do not think the Due Process Clause is offended merely
because the defendant has to board a plane to get to the site of the trial." World-
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 311 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985).
92. Id. at 475.
93. Honda Research & Dev., 718 S.W.2d at 551 (citing Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
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distinguishes the present case from World-Wide, in which the defendant's
relation to Oklahoma arose solely because of conduct by the plaintiff. World-
wide did not contemplate protecting the defendant whose contacts with the
forum owe to "interstate obligations voluntarily assumed.
'9 4
Courts have developed a "stream of commerce" 95 theory of personal
jurisdiction to deal with the exact situation presented in Honda R&D,96 but
this court did not apply it. The approach is not distinct from the International
Shoe analysis, rather, it is a special adaptation of International Shoe created
in response to modern commercial customs, in which goods travel across
state and national boundaries and through extensive distribution schemes
before reaching the ultimate consumer. Participation in any stage of the
stream of interstate commerce satisfies the "purposeful availment" require-
ment of the due process test.Y The general proposition is that a corporation
which wilfully injects a product into commercial channels, aware of the
ultimate destination of that product, will be held accountable wherever that
product may cause injury.98 Honda R&D was aware that its design would
result in the ATC's sale in America.9 9 In fact, the purpose of all its efforts
94. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474.
95. The stream of commerce theory was first suggested in Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). The
United States Supreme Court cited to World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 298 (1980), which in turn cited Gray, in approving the stream of commerce
theory in Burger King.
96. "The stream of commerce theory developed as a means of sustaining
jurisdiction in products liability cases in which the product had traveled through an
extensive chain of distribution before reaching the ultimate consumer." De James v.
Magnificence Carriers, 654 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085
(1981).
97. Omstead v. Brader Heaters, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 258, 270, 487 P.2d 234,
242 (1971); see also Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d
732 (1966).
98. In Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., Osaka, 715 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (9th Cir.
1983), a Japanese rope manufacturer was subject to jurisdiction in Oregon where a
longshoreman was injured by a defect in the rope. The court said: "[T]he company
sent a defective product into the world market with knowledge that harm could occur
wherever a defect should manifest itself." Id. The Federal District Court in Penn-
sylvania asserted juridiction over a French corporation which designed and manu-
factured bail bearings expressly for a helicopter which was manufactured in Italy and
sent to the United States in Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giov.
Anni Agusta, S.P.A. & S.N.F.A., 553 F. Supp. 328, 332-33 (E.D. Penn. 1982). The
court noted that "[d]uring the design and testing of the ball bearings . . . [the
defendant] was aware that the A-109 helicopter was targeted for the ... market in
the United States. . . ." Id. at 330. In Oswalt v. Scripto, 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.
1980), a Japanese cigarette lighter manufacturer was subject to jurisdiction in Texas
because it had knowledge that the American distributor of its product marketed the
lighters in Texas. Id. at 199-200.
99. Courts readily accept the proposition that corporations dealing with the
United States as one market are subject to the jurisdiction of each individual state.
See, e.g., Oswalt, 616 F.2d 191.
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was to see a product marketable in America. 1' ° An extended stream of com-
merce analysis is beyond the scope of this Note. Suffice it to say, however,
that many courts considering public policy'01 and the factors02 involved in a
stream of commerce analysis would allow Missouri jurisdiction over Honda
R&D.
Even without the benefit of the stream of commerce theory, the court
could have found that Honda R&D, by designing the ATC specifically for
the United States, purposefully availed itself to the American market's priv-
ileges and benefits. The ATC's presence in Missouri is the result of intentional
design, manufacturing and distribution efforts on the part of the three Honda
companies. The ATC was created by the engineers of Honda R&D. The
activity of Honda Ltd. and American Honda, while debatably unilateral, 0 3
did not result in a fortuitous contact with Missouri. Their efforts were but
further steps leading to the fruition of Honda- R&D's goal in designing the
ATC: to exploit the American market by introducing a product suitable for
use in winter. The "quality and nature" of Honda R&D's activity, namely
designing a product for the express purpose of seeing that product distributed
in the American market, satisfies the purposeful availment requirement.
Honda R&D directed itself toward the American market in order to
make a profit. Because of the ATC's success,'04 Honda R&D has certainly
"derived substantial benefits"'0 5 from international commerce. Indeed, no
market exists in Japan for the ATC.'06 Profits from the ATC's design flow
100. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
101. "With the breakdown in international commercial barriers, and the re-
sulting fact that a substantial portion of goods sold to American consumers today is
manufactured in foreign lands, we would be striking a serious blow at consumer
protection if we did not recognize such jurisdiction. We cannot expect consumers in
this state to travel to Japan ... to litigate injuries from tortious acts committed in
this state. . . ." Omstead v. Brader Heaters, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 258, 272, 487 P.2d
234, 242-43 (1971).
102. The following factors weigh in favor of asserting jurisdiction over a for-
eign defendant under the stream of commerce approach: defendant's awareness that
the product will find its way to the forum market; a marketing scheme which depends
on consumption in a foreign state; indirect marketing aimed at the forum; defendant's
location at the beginning of the chain, especially if no effort is made to limit the
scope of distribution; a cause of action which arises out of the defendant's product's
presence in the forum; heavier burden on plaintiff bringing suit in defendant's nation
than on defendant litigating in America; absence of conflicting interests between
defendant's nation and the forum; more efficient resolution in the forum state; like-
lihood that plaintiff will not have convenient or effective relief in the defendant's
nation; and dispute arises from commercial dealing. See cases cited supra note 97.
103. If the corporate inter-relationship is extremely close, the acts of Honda
Ltd. and American Honda may not be unilateral. The acts of one may be attributed
to all three. See cases cited supra note 16.
104. See supra note 2.
105. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
106. Statement of Edward Glynn, supra note 20.
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from the American market's need for a winter product, and the ATC's
fulfillment of that need. If Honda R&D received consideration from Honda
Ltd. for the right to manufacture the ATC, its benefit consists of the amount
of consideration. If not, it either does charity work, or it enjoys the proceeds
of ATC sales in America as a part of the Honda corporate family. At the
very least, the popularity of the ATC gives Honda R&D the reputation of
being a successful design company. The ATC owes its success to the con-
sumers of the United States. Accountability to American consumers in Amer-
ican courts should be the cost of this success.
The due process analysis puts potential defendants on notice that certain
activities in relation to a forum will subject them to that forum's jurisdiction.
Due process allows them to "structure their primary conduct with some
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them
liable to suit."' 7 Honda R&D structured its "primary conduct," designing
the ATC, directly at America from the very beginning. 03 If its conduct had
not resulted in some contact with America, namely the sale of the ATC, its
efforts would have been expended in vain. Product developers with any
knowledge of the American market are well aware of the extensive product
liability actions available to the American consumer. Honda R&D could have
taken the precautionary measures suggested by the World-Wide Court. 09
These options include procuring insurance, passing on the costs by charging
a higher price for the design, compelling indemnity from Honda Ltd., or
refusing to allow the ATC to be marketed in America (the absurdity of this
suggestion reflects the weakness of R&D's argument). Honda R&D structured
its conduct so as to indirectly serve the American market. A product which
is never designed can never be built, and a product never built is never sold.
Honda R&D's intentional efforts to serve the American market satisfy the
minimum contacts branch of the jurisdictional analysis.
As demonstrated, Honda R&D has substantial contacts with Missouri.
While these contacts may, by themselves, be sufficient to support jurisdiction,
the social policies underlying the second part of the Burger King analysis
reduce the contacts necessary to satisfy due process." 0 Four "other consid-
erations" specifically listed by the Supreme Court bolster the claim of ju-
risdiction in Missouri.
First, Missouri has a "manifest interest in providing its residents with
a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors.""'
Missouri also seeks to protect its residents from defectively designed products
which injure and kill. The state has implemented these interests through
107. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
108. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
109. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297.
110. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
111. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985).
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statutory enactment of a long-arm statute' 2 and judicial adoption of a strict
products liability cause of action."'
In addition to the state's interest, a court should consider the "plaintiff's
interest in convenient and effective relief.""14 The plaintiff's cause of action
was based on defective design. She had joined Honda R&D as a party in
order to seek discovery materials which the originally named defendants
claimed they could not obtain." 5 The court suggested that the plaintiff may
gain discovery from Honda R&D even if Honda R&D was not named." 6
This is not necessarily so. Discovery from Japanese companies is excruciat-
ingly difficult even when jurisdiction is established." 7 The court's ruling
effectively prohibited the plaintiff from gaining information on which she
had to base her case. The expansive jurisdictional test, designed to promote
substantive fairness over commercial form, abhors such a grossly unfair
situation."' Without discovery, which can be accomplished only through
joinder of Honda R&D, the plaintiff will have neither convenient nor effec-
tive relief.
A third consideration is "the interstate judicial system's interest in ob-
taining the most efficient resolution of controversies."" 9 This reflects a pri-
mary purpose of the due process analysis, which is to prevent a state from
invading the sovereignty of another state's courts. 20 In the present situation,
Missouri would offend no other state, as the only other possible forum is
Japan. American courts discount constitutional concerns when the potential
usurpation of sovereignty involves foreign nations. 2'
112. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 506.500 (1986).
113. Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfr. Corp., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
114. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
115. Brief for Respondent at 10, Honda Research & Dev., 718 S.W.2d 550
(1986) (No. 51655).
116. "It may be difficult, but plaintiffs can obtain the design information
through the deposition of a witness who is not a party." Honda Research & Dev.,
718 S.W.2d at 553.
117. "Japan is not a signatory to the Multilateral Convention on Taking of
Evidence in Civil or Commercial Matters (the Hague Convention). Thus discovery
materials provided for in the Convention are not available. Also, Japanese law and
procedure are substantially different from our own." Fox, Discovery from Japanese
Companies, 22 TgiAs 18 (August 1986).
118. "Jurisdictional rules may not be employed in such a way as to make
litigation 'so gravely difficult and inconvenient' that a party is at a 'severe disad-
vantage' in comparison to his opponent." Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
478 (1985).
119. Id. at 477.
120. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
121. See Comment, Jurisdiction-Foreign Defendants and Their Products: An
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The fourth factor, "the shared interest of the several States in furthering
substantive social policies,"' is the most significant in this case. All states
seek to protect their residents from injury by defective products. To further
this goal, most states have recognized a cause of action in strict products
liability. Essentially, a business responsible for the marketing of a defective
product is liable for any injury caused by the defect, regardless of any fault
or negligence on the company's part. 123 Strict product liability incorporates
several social policies. A producer is in a better position to bear the cost of
an injury than is the innocent consumer. The producer can procure insurance
and/or spread out the costs in the form of higher prices to all consumers.124
Because of their tremendous power, corporations need an external incentive
to be socially responsible. 25 Since profitability strikes closest to home for
corporate decision-makers, forcing them to pay for defective products re-
gardless of fault provides an incentive to market safer goods. In addition, a
designer is in the best position to remedy design defects. Strict liability places
the burden on the designer to discover and remedy such hazards.
If litigation is commenced due to a faulty product, several other reasons
justify strict liability. The ordinary consumer is not an engineer, nor is he
familiar with the developmental processes of complex products such as the
ATC. The designer/manufacturer has control over all information concerning
a product's design and manufacture. Strict liability compels those with know-
ledge, the developers, to come forth with information vital to a determination
of liability. With the aid of experts, a plaintiff can critically examine and
specifically demonstrate any alleged defect. Thus, strict liability has two
beneficiaries. The plaintiff benefits by gaining access to information with
which to make a case. The welfare of the general public is also advanced,
as producers have an incentive to make an effort to discover product defects
before they result in injury.
The holding in Honda R&D subverts these policies. As mentioned, Honda
Ltd. and American Honda claim that Honda R&D retains exclusive posses-
sion of design information.2 6 If HOnda R&D is not joined, this information
122. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
123. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963); see also Keener v. Dayton Elec., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
124. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436,
441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
125. "[I1t is one of the goals of litigation to compel corporations to exercise
a conscience in making decisions regarding product safety by making failure to do
so interfere with their profits." Smith & Shapiro, Corporate Liability in Defective
Products Cases, 19 TRiAL 80 (Nov. 1983).
126. The Honda companies offer conflicting explanations of the design ma-
terials' location. Honda R&D maintains that it sold its design of the ATC to Honda
Ltd, yet Honda Ltd. says it does not have the information. Honda Ltd. does not
explain how it is able to manufacture the ATC without knowing design specifications.
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may never be divulged. 27 The plaintiff may never be able prove a defect,
consequently, she will bear the cost of her injuries. The public welfare suffers
in two ways. First, an intensive examination of the design by the plaintiff
may have revealed a heretofore unknown defect. The defect could then be
remedied, assuring no future injuries. Secondly, Honda R&D has no incentive
to inspect its design. Even if a plaintiff does receive a favorable judgment,
no cash will flow from Honda R&D's pocket. No legal duty will prevent
new models of the ATC from incorporating the known, existing defect,
resulting in many more injuries to Missouri residents.
The "fair play and substantial justice" analysis demonstrates compelling
policy reasons in support of Missouri's jurisdiction. These policies combined
with the substantial minimum contacts between the designer and the forum
certainly satisfy the due process requirement. Perhaps Justice Brennan penned
a rallying cry for the cases developing the modem jurisdictional analysis:
"[Tihe Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial shield
to avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed.' '2 8
This cry falls on deaf ears in the present case. The precedent of Honda
R&D encourages a foreign manufacturer to split its research and design
department into a separate, wholly owned subsidiary for the sole purpose of
reducing the chance of a plaintiff receiving a product liability award. Amer-
ican consumers injured by defectively designed goods will face two choices:
litigate in a foreign country or bear the cost of injury themselves. The decision
also places one more case in the books which conducts only half the modern
due process analysis. Burger King represents the culmination of forty years
of cases developing a "reasonable and fair" jurisdictional analysis. The court
in Honda R&D fails to take advantage of the Supreme Court's wisdom.
JEREY J. SIMON
Also, American Honda gave an extensive history of the ATC's development, including
Honda R&D's response to significant technical problems encountered along the way
in a report to Congress. Statement of American Honda, supra note 4.
127. See supra note 117.
128. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
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